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Abstract
This thesis provides an analysis of the global concern with “illiberal democracies,” which
are states with at least some democratic institutions but diluted civil societies. From there, it
establishes Hungary as a case study of how a young democracy has entered into institutional
decline through an analysis of both the illiberal policies of the current Hungarian government as
well as relevant historical context that may have disadvantaged Hungary in transitioning to
democracy in the first place. As a post-communist country now heading down a path towards
increasing authoritarianism, Hungary serves as a prime example of this issue. Specific areas in
which illiberal policies have affected Hungary include the country’s press, judiciary, media, and
electoral system. These concerns have been identified by relevant scholarship as fundamental in
the movement towards an illiberal state. In this thesis, I am trying to prove that attempts to
manipulate a nation’s “public culture,” which is the manner in which a nation views itself
culturally, are closely correlated with illiberal governments and associated policies. Hungary
affirms this correlation due to the constant focus on cultural issues by its governing party, Fidesz,
through both rhetoric and associated messaging.
I.

Introduction
Illiberalism is an increasingly prevalent political philosophy in much of the world today.

While illiberal leaders are generally accepting of the need for democratic institutions to exist,
they attempt to degrade such institutions and also reduce the role of civil society in their home
countries. In recent years, illiberalism has become closely correlated with many far-right populist
movements around the world. Examples of far-right populist leaders in the world today include
Donald Trump in the United States, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Marine Le Pen in France, Nigel
Farage in the United Kingdom, and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. While many illiberal leaders are
not successful in severely degrading institutions and civil society in their home countries, some
have been. However, countries that are most prone to democratic decline are often ones with
shaky foundations in democracy to begin with. Viktor Orbán’s government in contemporary
Hungary serves as a striking and disturbing example of the corrosive effects of so-called
“illiberal democracy” (Bánkuti 2012, 145). Even the use of the term “illiberal democracy” is
problematic, because democratic institutions begin to degrade if they become illiberal. During

Rizzi 2
his tenure, Orbán has bought out media outlets, run incendiary and propagandistic campaigns
against migrants and George Soros, and degraded the independence of his country’s judiciary. It
is evident that the most prominent effect of illiberalism in a country is the dilution of civil
society. This is achieved under illiberal governments by rhetoric attempting to change the public
culture of a nation. That may include, but is not limited to, fervently nationalistic or irredentist
remarks.
One of the reasons that Hungary was vulnerable to illiberalism today was not only its
past, but also because it is difficult for post-communist countries to successfully build up
institutions and transition to democracy. Despite Orbán’s authoritarian instincts, Hungary had
been more successful in building up democratic institutions than many other post-communist
countries. However, he has been able to exploit many of the institutions that were built up for the
first time in the 1990s. Some political scientists believe that lower political participation and
activism than in many Eastern European countries as well as the lack of labor unions have
hindered Hungary’s attempt to transition to democracy today (Seleny 1999, 489-492). They
would argue that if the public places less emphasis on being politically informed, democracy as a
whole will start to degrade since democracy can only truly manifest itself as a work of the
people.
Orbán’s authoritarian appeals are also rooted in supposed nostalgia for the past. This is a
common tactic not only of authoritarian leaders, but right-wing populists in general as well.
These sorts of leaders use rhetoric intended to make their supporters feel nostalgic for the days of
“strong” leaders, rather than feeling optimistic about their future. They often further attempt to
generate support by noting that the past was often an era before modern cultural issues
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considered progressive in nature sprung to fruition. Economic decline or stagnation often
increases the appeal of this type of rhetoric, because in those cases, at least a certain group of the
public will view the so-called “good old days” as a period of greater economic strength and
prosperity relative to the present. As in many post-communist countries in Central and Eastern
Europe, discussions on critical issues that would greatly affect the attempt to transition to
democracy could be a key source of political friction between citizens. These issues would
include how newly transitioning post-communist countries should deal with those who worked in
state agencies that committed human rights abuses during the communist era, such as spies and
secret police officers (Judt 2006, 698-699). Because actions taken on these issues by many
post-communist countries, including Hungary, were not supported by all of the population,
Hungary’s beginning of its transition to democracy was initially somewhat of a rocky one.
Eventually, some improvements to the public discourse regarding how to remember the
communist regime may have been made. For example, it gradually became less accepted over
time to simply refer to anti-communists as “fascists” (Judt 2006, 826). Yet difficulties over how
exactly to remember Hungary’s troubled history has bitterly divided the country’s electorate, a
fact which has been exploited by Orbán and his party’s political rhetoric. These issues can be
considered concerns of “transitional justice,” as they concern how to bring justice to those
involved in abuses during the past of a country. Many successful examples of transitional justice
have included trials, reparations, and/or a truth and reconciliation commission. The differences in
how Hungary has remembered its Nazi past in comparison to its communist past are also very
stark.
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Orbán has had a stark and shocking ideological evolution over the course of his life.
When he was young, he was an anti-communist rebel, yet by today he has morphed into an
autocratic right-wing populist. How did this happen? One explanation may possibly be rooted in
his aggressive personality. Orbán’s college roommate and eventual rival noted that as early as
the 1980s, Orbán had “domineering, intolerant ways of thinking and behaving that are all too
evident in him today. There was also an expediency about him, one without any principles. He
was, in addition to all of this, sincere and likeable” (Fodor quoted in Lendvai 19, 2017). After the
fall of communism, Orbán founded Fidesz, a younger-skewing party attempting to bring
democracy to Hungary by arguing that only young adults could clean up the mess that “adults”
had made of Hungary and give birth to democratic institutions in the country. Fidesz held a
prominent presence in Hungarian politics until 2002, when a center-left socialist bloc was
elected. The socialists eventually ended up destroying themselves due to corruption, paving the
way for Fidesz to be elected in 2010. During the time of the socialist government, it is possible
that Orbán became increasingly demoralized and began to believe that the only way possible to
maintain power is to subvert the democratic norms and institutions that have been put in place to
hopefully put such political power in check. However, we do not know for sure just how Orbán
ended up having such a massive ideological shift over the course of his public life.
Orbán came to power in 2010, as Fidesz received not only the highest number of votes
for any political party in Hungary during the 2010 elections but a disproportionately elected
supermajority in the Hungarian parliament. While the corruption of the Hungarian socialists back
then was nowhere near the current scale and magnitude of Orbán’s corruption, that is not
relevant in the public eye since an increasingly pro-Orbán media climate in Hungary helps
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Fidesz get away with corruption and cronyism. Orbán is able to stay in power is that his political
opposition in Hungary is both weak and incredibly fractured. The socialists have been unable to
even remotely gain mainstream traction among the Hungarian electorate during Orbán’s nine
years and counting in power. Today, Fidesz controls a supermajority in Hungary’s parliament.
This has been achieved not only through electoral success but also through extensive
gerrymandering efforts. The main opposition party in Hungary, Jobbik, is a formerly fascist and
ultra-nationalist party that has been accused of anti-Semitism in the past. However, as Fidesz
moves further and further to the extreme right, Jobbik has actually moved towards the center. If
Fidesz and Jobbik are considered to be out of the mainstream of European politics in general,
then there is no clear mainstream political movement in opposition to Orbán that is either
relatively successful today or currently gaining ground. While it would be difficult to generate
powerful political opposition to Orbán in contemporary Hungary due to extensive
gerrymandering and an array of other inherent advantages that Fidesz has in the electoral
process, the weakness of Orbán’s political opposition is still jarring even among other countries
led by far-right populists. In the May 2019 European Parliament elections in Hungary, the most
successful opposition coalition or party received only 16.26 percent of the vote, or less than
one-sixth. Orbán’s continued illiberalism and autocratic tendencies will only further hinder his
opposition from potentially gaining ground, much less political strength.
Despite the rampant corruption of Orbán’s government today, Fidesz has stood to benefit
politically from perceptions of corruption in Hungary among past postcommunist governments.
Hungary’s left-wing governments since the fall of communism engaged in considerable amounts
of corruption, and did not necessarily do much to ease the transition to democracy (Mueller
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2014, 16). As a result, Orbán can depict himself as a conservative opponent of corruption, even
though his government is involved in rampant corruption on a level that far exceeds the misdeeds
committed during Hungary’s socialist governments. This is heightened by the fact that he
sometimes calls his political opponents communists to attempt to silence political debate with
them, a false and venomous smear that could be compared to so-called “McCarthyism” in the
United States in the 1950s. This attempt to shut down discourse with political opponents by
claiming that they may be communists is a common tactic among far-right populist leaders. It is
also ironic given that Orbán has aggressively tried to rhetorically extinguish Hungary’s
communist past while still supporting policies such as state control of prominent industries
(Dunai 2012). These sorts of attacks also gain greater relevance in a country that suffered greatly
under the hands of a communist Soviet regime for decades, and as a result are very effective in
helping cement support for Fidesz among at least a certain subset of the Hungarian population.
These voters may then view contemporary Hungarian politics as a battle between “freedom” and
“Marxism.” While Hungary today is certainly not as anti-democratic as it was under Soviet rule,
simply projecting allegations of authoritarianism onto opponents of Fidesz ends up deflecting
from Orbán and Fidesz’s authoritarian tendencies.

II.

The Ideology of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz
A. Populism
The electoral victories of Orbán and his far-right party, Fidesz, can be attributed at least

to some extent due to Fidesz’s populist rhetoric. Populism is a political philosophy that claims to
specifically focus on the needs of ordinary people. There are many varieties of populist political
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movements, including on both the left and the right side of the political spectrum. Populist
leaders often use rhetoric that attacks “elites,” who are then accused of being inconsiderate
towards the needs of ordinary working people. Many populists often refer to ordinary people that
they claim to represent as “real” citizens, in an attempt to contrast them in an incendiary sense
with the elites. It is important to understand that criticism of the role of elites in public life does
not automatically make one a populist (Müller 2016, 101). In his book What Is Populism?,
Jan-Werner Müller claims that populists are also “antipluralist” because “They claim that they
and they alone represent the people. All other political competitors are essentially illegitimate,
and anyone who does not support them is not properly part of the people” (Müller 2016, 101).
Because of the divisive nature of rhetoric against pluralism, populists often attempt to divide
society at large in an attempt to pit their supporters against others. Such a divisive outlook on
politics can often exacerbate political polarization. This polarization often occurs through the
establishment of “the people” as the “in-group,” and perceived opponents or enemies (including,
but certainly not limited to, the elite) as the “out-group.” Fidesz tends to attempt to drum up
popular support during elections by often attempting to use anti-immigrant rhetoric. As a result,
they claim that they stand for native-born Hungarians rather than potential migrants to Hungary.
This divisive strategy is often politically successful in a country with a very low percentage of
foreign-born residents.
Populist rhetoric is used by Orbán not only to polarize Hungarian society, but also to
degrade the country’s democracy through illiberalism. This is because much of the divisive
message that Fidesz campaigns on is primarily targeted at liberals, whereas those who are
illiberal are portrayed as the “in-group.” Orbán has claimed that liberalism is not a requirement
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for a democracy. In 2014, he said that “A democracy is not necessarily liberal. Just because
something is not liberal, it still can be a democracy” (Orbán quoted in Krastev 2018). It can be
inferred from Fidesz’s rhetoric that the dividing line between liberalism and illiberalism is their
views on the role of civil society. Liberals tend to view civil society as a requirement for a
healthy democracy that must work in tandem with robust personal freedoms. Such organizations
supported by liberals to achieve this goal include academic institutions, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs,) and philanthropic foundations dedicated to promoting liberal causes. All
of these organizations have been attacked by Orbán during his government’s tenure. Prominent
liberal individuals in both Hungary and the region are also harassed by Fidesz’s messaging and
rhetoric. This includes the Hungarian-American financier George Soros, European Commission
leader Jean-Claude Juncker, and prominent opposition politicians. Prominent liberal ideas at
odds with Fidesz’s far-right, nationalistic ideology are also excoriated by Orbán’s rhetoric.
Examples of such ideas include tolerance for immigration, multiculturalism, and pluralism.
When propagandistic rhetoric is used frequently by a government to make a case against civil
society, this turns at least some opinions in the general public away from understanding the
importance these institutions play in a healthy democracy.
Orbán’s illiberalism and populism are also manifested through his anti-EU rhetoric.
Fidesz media has routinely portrayed the EU as being controlled by liberal elites, and their
attacks on the EU have intensified since Fidesz was suspended from the EPP. He has intensified
his attacks on both the EPP and the EU since being suspended from the former. This has been
done through ad hominem attacks and billboard campaigns against Jean-Claude Juncker. The
future of Fidesz in the European Parliament is uncertain to a certain extent, despite the party’s

Rizzi 9
electoral success in the 2019 European Parliament elections. Regarding the EPP, Orbán said that
“We would not like to belong somewhere where we don’t have an influence on the main strategy
issues” (Than 2019 and Dunai 2019). It is likely that Orbán would feel more welcomed among
the increasing bloc of far-right parties in the European Parliament rather than the EPP. While the
EPP is a conservative voting bloc that is center-right in ideology, it is supportive of liberal
democracy, placing it at odds with Orbán in some cases. The EPP would firmly condemn
Orbán’s attacks on civil society and the rule of law in his home country, some of which he would
attempt to justify by claiming that he is obliged with protecting Hungarian culture against that of
foreigners and their interests. Fidesz has figured out that they can use the EU as political bait by
claiming to rural voters that they represent the common people, as opposed to out-of-touch
bureaucrats in Brussels. This strategy is politically successful for them because the countryside is
where support for Orbán is the strongest in Hungary. Appeal to rural areas is generally a key
component of many far-right populist and even authoritarian movements. Since he is from a
small town, Orbán is able to project the image of a populist “country boy” with enough of a
degree of authenticity to allow voters to buy into such a depiction (Komuves 2018).

B. Fidesz’s Anti-Migrant Views and Policies
Orbán’s pervasive anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies are likely attempts to shore up his
political base. He can use such rhetoric to sell himself as the strongman leader that Hungarians
need to protect themselves from migrants or other cultures. This is a common tactic used by
far-right populists around the world (Norris and Inglehart 2019, 7). Orbán built a fence on
Hungary’s southern border with Serbia in an attempt to stop incoming migrants. Freedom
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House’s 2019 report on Hungary notes that “Only two asylum seekers are formally permitted to
enter the country per day” (Freedom House 2019). Migrants and asylum seekers in Hungary are
frequently denied basic rights and civil liberties. A policy of denying food to migrants in transit
zones that were appealing denied asylum claims was in effect until a European Court of Human
Rights decision in 2018 (Freedom House 2019). Today, lawyers or other works attempting to
help potential migrants and asylum seekers in Hungary face the possibility of jail time (King).
These sorts of policies are detrimental to Hungary’s record on human rights, as well as the
country’s standing both on the world stage and as an EU member. Most reasons against
immigration given by the government both officially and via propagandistic messaging are
cultural in nature. Fidesz claims to want to control the Hungarian national identity. According to
them, this means that those who do not fit their normative mold of a Hungarian identity are
excluded. While migrants and asylum seekers are the two groups most commonly targeted by
Fidesz messaging, another discriminated group whose oppression has been heightened during
Orbán’s tenure is the Roma population, commonly known as “gypsies.” Roma people were
targeted by the Nazis during World War II. Today, discrimination against them in Europe has
made disturbing advances due to the growth of the radical right as well as conspiracy theories
spread around several European countries, including one claiming that the Roma people are
snatching children. Discrimination and inequality against the Roma people is tragically
widespread in a variety of ways in Hungary, from income disparities to education (Freedom
House 2019).
By using immigration as his signature political issue when campaigning for elections in
Hungary, Orbán makes it clear that his primary goal is to exert force on the collective values of
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his country for political gain, especially to promote illiberalism. Orbán primarily campaigned on
the immigration issue in the April 2018 election in Hungary, in which he was elected for a third
term. In June 2018, Orbán was quoted saying to reporters in Brussels that “The invasion should
be stopped” (King 2018). According to Fidesz messaging, migration serves not only as a threat
to Hungary, but an invasion of national sovereignty and the culture of the Hungarian people and
nation. Even after he was elected for the third time in 2018, Orbán has still continued to
campaign by railing against migrants. On May 26, 2019, Fidesz won a majority of seats in
Hungary’s elections for the European Parliament. Orbán claimed that the results of this election
gave Fidesz a mandate of “stopping immigration all across Europe” and to “protect Christian
culture in Europe” (Than 2019 and Dunai 2019). Given that there are so few migrants and
refugees in Hungary, the only time that many Hungarians even come into any sort of encounter
with the immigration issue is by absorbing government-influenced media or messaging
campaigns on immigration. Orbán intentionally chooses not to campaign on issues that impact
Hungarians in their daily lives, such as the economy or wages, but rather through demagoguery.
This is because such rhetoric ends up serving as the glue to build cohesion within his political
base, as well as heighten the appeal of a so-called political “strongman.”
It is also important to understand that Fidesz’s scapegoating of migrants is not only for
cultural reasons, but likely to also capitalize on economic concerns among the Hungarian
populace. Incomes in Hungary tend to be much lower than in Western Europe, and it has become
increasingly difficult for the country to compete economically with many of Europe’s economic
strongholds. As a result, Orbán can present his rhetoric to try to alleviate economic anxieties
among the general population by attempting to claim that migrants threaten Hungary’s economy.

Rizzi 12
This is both untrue and ironic, as Hungary is actually losing out on much potential economic
growth by exerting near-total prohibitions on migrants and refugees. However, when an
electorate is both angry and potentially even frightened over their personal financial situation,
they may be more vulnerable and susceptible to divisive and antipluralist rhetoric, especially
since these people would tend to put themselves in the “in-group” and view whoever the
demagogue declares as “them” as the “out-group.” Economic concerns in Hungary are also
skewed by the fact that Western-style capitalism is not considered politically popular in
Hungary. Krisztián Ungváry notes that “Capitalism, liberalism and free enterprise have
traditionally, for most of the population, been unhappy experiences of perceived as such. In the
19th century only two groups, the Jews and the German-Hungarians, managed to profit from the
social and political changes” (Ungváry 2014, 13). If views of liberalism are correlated at least
somewhat to how citizens view at least some degree of economic and social liberty with
skepticism, a key voting bloc of the electorate may be especially vulnerable to illiberal rhetoric
and appeals.

C. Irredentism
Along with fervent nationalism, irredentism is another key element of Fidesz’s recent
ideology. Irredentism is the view that a nation actually controls territory that is a part of other
nation(s) and must avenge such lost territory. While it is highly unlikely that Orbán would
actually try to annex any territory from a country, such as the way that Vladimir Putin invaded
Crimea, he still frequently uses appeals to an empirical-style state to attempt to mold Hungarian
cultural values into his own illiberal image. In the summer of 2018, Orbán gave a controversial
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speech at the Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp in Romania. This speech
raised eyebrows due to its irredentist content. Orbán referred to an area of Romania by its
Hungarian name, the Székely Land, and claimed that people in Budapest don’t even believe it
really exists (Orbán 2018). Some might wonder why Orbán even bothers with this rhetoric, given
that there is really no chance he would actually try to take Romanian territory. It gives his
supporters an idealistic image of Hungary as an empirical state that serves as a strong
international power, and also gives his supporters a false sense of “hope” that Orbán will restore
Hungary in exactly that manner. Orbán also claimed that “we should look upon Transylvania as a
resource” and that the Székely Land “will still exist when the whole of Europe has already
submitted to Islam” (Orbán 2018). These comments show a clear parallel between Orbán’s
“culture war” outlook on politics in general and his specifically irredentist resource. In order for
Hungary to be a “dominant” nation in terms of territory, Orbán believes that it must also be
culturally dominant. This must be done by imposing a nationalistic and Christian culture on the
Hungarian public, and then seeking to aggressively maintain its status quos by systemically
degrading civil society and its impact on public life in Hungary. Furthermore, Orbán believes
that there is historical justification for the irredentist rhetoric he believes in that has been present
for almost a century. The Treaty of Trianon “took away two-thirds of the country’s territory and
left millions of ethnic Hungarians living in what are now Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia” (Lowe
and Peto 2013). This treaty was passed in 1920. Finally, Orbán believes that irredentist rhetoric
is necessary to build social cohesion and strengthen the national identity of the Hungarian
people.
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Orbán has also offered both citizenship and passports to the Hungarian diaspora. Even
though he knows that Hungary will not reclaim territory lost due to the Treaty of Tianon, he
believes that offering citizenship to ethnic Hungarians around the world is the next-best
alternative to creating a fully Hungarian ethno-nationalist state. These citizens from the
Hungarian diaspora can vote in the country’s elections. Some believe that Orbán has done so
much outreach to Hungarians living outside of Hungary to solicit political support for Fidesz
from them (Lowe and Peto 2013). Furthermore, Orbán’s irredentism and extensive focus on the
Hungarian diaspora has created tensions with nearby countries with considerable populations of
ethnic Hungarians. The irony of Orbán’s focus on the Hungarian diaspora is that even though he
views pleasing Hungarians as necessary compared to the alternative of accepting migrants to
grow Hungary’s population, his outreach to the Hungarian diaspora does not have considerable
effects reversing the declining population trends in Hungary. Some of Hungary’s cities,
including Budapest, are experiencing a shortage of workers. Most people in the Hungarian
diaspora would not seriously consider moving to Hungary; in fact, many of them do not even
know much Hungarian. Yet Orbán would never consider accepting migrants in Hungary, because
such a policy would be completely antithetical to the far-right nationalism he has built up as his
political brand name.

III.

Viktor Orbán’s Attacks on Hungary’s Constitution and Democratic Norms
A. Consolidation of Power
Fidesz has primarily attempted to further seize power through constitutional revisions

that have long been considered dubious. Due to unusual provisions in electoral law, Fidesz ended
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up with a supermajority in the Hungarian parliament in 2010 despite receiving 53 percent of the
vote (Mueller 2014, 15). This led to Fidesz writing a new constitution in 2012 solely by
themselves and without any input from opposition parties. Besides attempting to force out
non-loyalists from a variety of positions subject to government oversight, the revised constitution
further attacked basic freedoms and civil society. Several amendments to the constitution were
passed in 2013. These amendments included only permitting campaigning for elections to state
media, and restrictions on students receiving state grants (BBC 2013). These “reforms” have
been criticized by a variety of international organizations for being antithetical to democracy, as
well as by the Hungarian political opposition. The Socialist Party boycotted the vote on these
constitutional revisions (BBC 2013). During this time, Orbán further inflamed culture wars by
suggesting that political opposition to him was antithetical to the Hungarian nation. He claimed
that the “nation cannot be in opposition” (Mueller 2014, 16). Orbán engages in such rhetoric to
try to flame ultra-nationalism as patriotism, and opposition to nationalism as seemingly
“un-Hungarian.” He can thus further depict his attacks on democracy as a part of attempting to
shape his country’s public culture, through constant attacks on “elites” and pervasive rhetoric
about how he represents the “real Hungary.” Shockingly, Orbán not only commits
anti-democratic actions but also campaigns on them during Hungarian election campaigns. When
Orbán ran for a third term in the spring of 2018, he touted legislation that has been referred to as
the “Stop Soros” law. This name comes from the “Stop Soros” television ad that has played on
Hungarian TV stations (Mackey 2018). This bill was written to target non-governmental
organizations that are considered by Fidesz to “support illegal immigration,” and placed
draconian restrictions on them. These NGOs would have been required to be screened on
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grounds of national security, pay a 25 percent tax on foreign donations, and potentially be
banned from coming close to the country’s borders with Ukraine and Serbia (Mackey 2018).

B. Popular and Rhetorical Support for Illiberal and Anti-Democratic Activities
Orbán wants to generate popular support for his anti-democratic actions, so all of his
rhetoric designed to shape Hungary’s public culture is intended to give cover to (and generate
acceptance of) his attacks on democratic norms in Hungary. This is the clear reason why he
continues to repeatedly use George Soros as a scapegoat. After all, Orbán sells himself as a
strongman leader who is both in touch with rural and conservative Hungarians and a defender of
traditional Christian values. To Orbán, Soros represents a threat to what he views as the
traditional Hungarian way of life. As a result, the so-called “Stop Soros” law was sold to the
Hungarian public via Fidesz-supported media as an attack against Soros, and by extension,
traditionalist cultural conservatism in Hungary. From there, Fidesz voters became more and more
accepting of any sort of legislation they view as hindering to the “agenda” of George Soros, even
though they do not take much time to think about the law’s severe consequences for the future of
Hungarian democracy. After all, Orbán’s degradation of civil society and associated democratic
norms in Hungary have already harmed the country’s place on the world stage as well as its
future on a number of levels.
In addition to passing anti-democratic laws, Orbán also campaigns on aggressively
amending his country’s constitution. During the campaign leading up to the 2018 Hungarian
election, Orbán campaigned on amending the constitution to try to block EU migrant quotas
(Santora and Bienvenu 2018). Some of the most incendiary and anti-democratic rhetoric by

Rizzi 17
Fidesz degrades the fairness of the electoral process in Hungary. While elections in Hungary are
free in that they are open to a wide array of political parties, many of the more anti-democratic
changes to Hungarian society under Orbán makes them less fair. The head of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission in Hungary was quoted in a New York Times
article saying that “Voters had a wide range of political options, but intimidating and xenophobic
rhetoric, media bias, and opaque campaign financing constricted the space for genuine political
debate” (Wake quoted in Santora and Bienvenu 2018). Wake’s argument is that while politics
has has always been rife with statements that are not completely true, Orbán’s propagandistic
rhetoric that borders on conspiracy theories is so far removed from reality that it does a critical
disservice to real, fact-based political discourse in Hungary. Given the miniscule number of
migrants allowed to enter Hungary each year, rhetoric claiming an “invasion” of migrants is
completely antithetical to basic fact. This past fall, Orbán started the process of revising
Hungary’s constitution, which is expected to further trample on basic democratic norms in
Hungary. He told a state radio station in the summer of 2018 that “In the autumn we would like
to launch a 1-1.5 year long constitution revision where we will look at what has worked and what
could have worked ... and find potential gaps which we need to fill in with new constitutional
text” (Orbán quoted in Than 2018).
Gerrymandering is another anti-democratic tactic used by Fidesz to remain in power.
This term refers to dubious redrawing of electoral districts to unfairly give advantage to a
political party. Because of Fidesz’s extensive gerrymandering efforts, it is unlikely that they will
be able to remain in power for a long time. Fidesz lowered the number of members of parliament
from 386 to 199, and reduced the number of electoral districts from 176 to 106 (Novak 2018).
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The goal of these efforts was to further cement Fidesz’s stronghold on Hungarian politics in
general. The remaining members of parliament not directly tied to an electoral district would be
elected through “party lists” (Novak 2018). This tactic was also created to disproportionately
benefit Fidesz. Besides these dubious actions, Orbán has also tried to actively limit the abilities
of opposition parties to make gains in Hungarian elections. For example, he abolished a previous
law that required a runoff vote if no candidate initially received an outright majority (Novak
2018). Orbán worked to get rid of this law to exploit and take advantage of the extremely
fractured political opposition to Fidesz in Hungary. Since there is no clear opposition party with
significant political support by itself, a runoff-free electoral system allows Fidesz to steamroll
through many electoral districts in Hungary even if they do not receive an outright majority of
votes. Orbán engages in gerrymandering and electoral disenfranchisement to keep a tight grip on
Hungarian politics so he can continue shaping Hungary’s public culture. Many of his political
decisions made as prime minister are primarily executed based on the fact that they will help
Fidesz remain in power. This includes other efforts beyond strictly electoral reforms, such as
offering citizenship to members of the Hungarian diaspora, which Orbán views as likely
beneficial to Fidesz politically.

C. Corruption
Corruption in government under Fidesz is another major concern and threat for the
country’s democracy. These issues are unique because many average Hungarians are not aware
of the extent of the corruption in the current government. They simply focus on Orbán’s
“culture-war” rhetoric, since that is what he primarily uses to make rhetorical appeals to the
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public and is what pro-government media outlets incessantly report on. While corruption is
prohibited under Hungarian law, many of these prohibitions are not always enforced in practice,
especially under Fidesz. The Hungarian Criminal Code bans bribery as well as “most other forms
of corruption offenses contained in international anti-corruption conventions” (GAN last updated
2017). In recent years, Fidesz’s takeover of much of the public sector in Hungary has made it
harder for fair and impartial oversight of the public sector against corruption to be carried out
properly and genuinely. When Orbán loyalists are in charge of a wide variety of government
organizations, they will be more likely to turn a blind eye to corruption issues they see not only
to protect their friends, but also out of fear of possible retribution by Fidesz for alleged
“disloyalty.” Corruption issues in Hungary’s judiciary has increased as Fidesz has cemented
more and more control over this institution over the years. There have been instances of bribes or
improper payments to judges in return for an expected favorable verdict on a legal case (GAN
last updated 2017). Corruption in Hungary’s judiciary is also closely related to increasing
concerns about the lack of due process in the country’s legal system. Tünde Handó has been
criticized for transferring court cases to the courts she selects during her tenure as leader of the
OBH (Freedom House 2019). Furthermore, the increasing prevalence of corruption and
decreasing judicial independence has also been bad for business, as many companies looking to
invest in the region have become increasingly concerned about the country’s dying democracy.
Orbán has not only been accused of corruption surrounding the manner in which Fidesz
has used EU development funds, but also mismanagement. Many of the projects built using EU
development funds seem highly impractical at first glance, and not all of them adhere to EU rules
and guidelines on development projects for member nations. For example, a bridge leading to a

Rizzi 20
“bicycle adventure park” was a recent project in Hungary built with EU development funds, but
the bridge and the park are used by very few people due to poor construction that has led to
safety concerns (Gorondi 2019). It is possible that support to suspend Hungary from the EPP
increased recently among members of the bloc because they feel they do not have much to lose
by excluding Hungary. Hungary is a small country with average incomes and a per-capita GDP
lower than much of Europe, especially compared to western Europe. Orbán’s misuse of EU
development money is a burden on the EU, since they are providing money that is essentially
being wasted or used for outrageous vanity projects. The EPP was also concerned about the
rising cronyism and lack of accountability in Hungary for Fidesz’s corruption.
In addition to misusing EU development funds, Orbán also uses Hungarian taxpayer
funds to pay for personal vanity projects. Some of the most outrageous vanity projects he has
supported were built for Felcsút, a very small town in which Orbán is from. These projects might
also be referred to as examples of so-called “pork-barrel politics,” a term used to describe
extensive and superfluous projects supported by politicians for the primary benefit of their home
communities. The two main pork-barrel projects that Orbán has built in Felcsút are a 4,000 seat
football stadium named after one of Hungary’s greatest football players, and a narrow-gauge
railway that runs the three and a half miles from Felcsút to an estate bought by his father (Foster
2016). Both of these projects have been criticized by locals as well as Orbán’s political
opponents as excessive, and simply reminiscent of Orbán’s personal desires rather than that of
the general public in Hungary. After all, Felcsút is an extremely small town, so development
projects designed to benefit the greatest number of people possible would probably focus on
more populated regions of the country. The vanity of these projects is even more striking when
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one considers that both are located remarkably close to the doorstep of Orbán’s country home
(Foster 2016). These projects also show that Orbán is not only misusing EU development funds,
but also money from the Hungarian government. He does not do this alone. Fidesz MPs in
Hungary approve the appropriation of large sums of money for these sorts of projects, as they
know they must stay loyal to Orbán in order to still be viewed positively by him. Furthermore,
high-level individuals in Orbán’s inner circle, such as Fidesz leaders and oligarchs, are the target
audience as to who (besides Orbán and his family) could not only afford to use these projects,
but would use them in practice.

D. Hungary’s Judiciary
Orbán has also attempted to shape Hungary’s public culture due to his degradation of the
independence of Hungary’s judiciary during his tenure as prime minister. In 2010, Fidesz
amended the Hungarian constitution with an amendment allowing the governing party to
nominate judges to the Constitutional Court, rather than requiring the consent of a majority of
parliamentary parties to a judge before a confirmation vote would be held in parliament (Bánkuti
et al. 2012, 139) As a result, Fidesz was able to nominate constitutional judges that were far
more ideological than judicial appointments in Hungary have traditionally been since the
country’s transition to democracy. Between 2010 and 2014, all of the eleven judges appointed in
the Constitutional Court were selected by Fidesz (Freedom House 2019). Today, Fidesz has a
supermajority in Hungary’s parliament. As a result, they will continue to keep nominating
staunchly partisan judges who will be loyal to Orbán. Furthermore, Hungary’s National Judiciary
Office (OBH) has been staunchly criticized by the international community for its partiality. It is
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run by Tünde Handó, who is a close friend of Orbán and married to the leader of Fidesz’s bloc in
the European Parliament (Freedom House 2019). Her wide-ranging role at the OBH is also
problematic as it may also serve as an example of nepotism, which is a sign of a democracy in
decline in and of itself. One of the primary reasons why Fidesz was suspended from the EPP this
year was the increasing lack of judicial independence in Hungary during the government’s time
in power. In December 2018, the Hungarian parliament passed a proposal setting up a parallel
system of administrative courts that would be directly overseen by the justice minister (Freedom
House 2019). This proposal led to intense backlash among not only segments of Hungary’s
political opposition, but from the European Union as well as an array of watchdog groups from
around the world. It is practically a certainty that a parallel administrative court system would
further be filled with Fidesz loyalists, and would further harm the independence of the judiciary.
On May 31, 2019, the Hungarian government decided to scrap plans for a parallel
administrative court system (Gosling 2019). This was done in an attempt to try to prevent
worsening relations with mainstream parties in the European Parliament. Even before the
country’s suspension from the EPP, Hungary has long been on incredibly shaky ground with the
European Parliament. In the fall of 2018, the European Parliament opened an Article 7 procedure
into Hungary after a narrow vote (Freedom House 2019). This procedure could potentially result
in Hungary losing its voting rights and/or losing critical EU funding (Gosling 2019). Despite
these considerable sanctions, it remains unlikely that Orbán will seriously want to change his
behavior away from his most explicitly authoritarian leanings. This is because his attacks on
democratic institutions are done under the cover of culture-based, incendiary rhetoric common
among far-right populists. As a result, when Fidesz does something anti-democratic or corrupt, it
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has an impact on Hungary’s public culture because it is able to happen under the mask of
“culture-war” rhetoric designed to appeal to conservative, rural voters that are most likely to vote
for and support Fidesz. Furthermore, Orbán is concerned first and foremost with Fidesz
remaining in power for as long as possible, and much of the overtly anti-democratic reforms that
the Hungarian parliament has passed since 2010 are clearly designed to do exactly that at the
expense of a fair electoral process, much less a robust civil society that can also help promote
checks and balances on the government.
Another highly concerning corruption issue issue during Orbán’s tenure is the allegation
that the Hungarian prosecutor’s office has acted selectively and partially for ideological reasons.
This office has not investigated accusations that Orbán’s government misused EU development
funds (Freedom House 2019). By hindering the ability of a prosecutor’s office to conduct
legitimate oversight against potential corruption, trust in government as well as perceived levels
of transparency among its citizens begin to degrade. Tragically, the failure to investigate
potential misuse of EU development money may assist Orbán in attempting to change his
country’s public culture. This is because if Orbán’s “EU development projects” are not perceived
of as beneficial, much less efficaciously positive, in the eyes of at least a considerable number of
Hungarians, they may become more doubtful of the need for EU development funding as a
whole. This allows more and more people in Hungary to be susceptible to Orbán’s anti-EU
rhetoric, such as the controversial poster campaign during the spring of 2019 that crudely
juxtaposed George Soros and Jean-Claude Juncker, vilifying and slandering both men in the
process. The 2019 Freedom House report on Hungary also notes that “Influential business
figures who fall out of favor with the government, such as Lajos Simicska, who once served as
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Fidesz party treasurer, have experienced financial and legal pressure” (Freedom House 2019). As
a result, not only has Orbán managed to take over much of Hungary’s judiciary on a number of
levels, he has also engaged in rampant politicization of such an institution by encouraging
defense and shielding of his friends and coordinated harassment of his perceived enemies. While
Hungary’s levels of corruption are generally considered lower than many parts of the world,
corruption levels are far higher than much of the rest of Europe. Out of the 28 countries in the
European Union, Hungary ranks in 26th in the most recent Transparency International survey on
corruption issues (Gorondi 2019).

IV.

Viktor Orbán’s Use of Propaganda and Control of the Press
A. Posters and Billboards
Orbán often diffuses misinformation that conforms to his far-right ideology via poster

and billboard campaigns. This is because such posters can be placed in strategic locations for the
greatest number of people to see them, such as at bus stations or alongside major roads. The
more people that see such propagandistic posters, the more likely at least some people may buy
into the claims that Orbán is attempting to make. In the spring of 2019, Orbán ran a billboard
campaign alleging some sort of sinister conspiracy involving the European Commission and
George Soros. The posters used in the campaign were put up in public places all over Hungary.
Their design can be described as two juxtaposed and likely-altered photos of George Soros and
Jean-Claude Juncker laughing alongside a caption that translates in English to “You have a right
to know what Brussels is planning” (Euronews 2019). Orbán has frequently accused Soros of
conspiring to allow mass migration into Hungary against the Hungarian government’s wishes.
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These advertisements have been accused of anti-Semitism, especially since Soros is Jewish and
has been the subject of many conspiracy theories from far-right individuals and anti-Semites
around the world. The surprising and ironic thing about this campaign is that since Orbán has
almost completely shut down immigration into Hungary, there is virtually no net migration. Far
more Hungarians are emigrating the country than people are immigrating to Hungary, which
could have considerably negative effects. Many young Hungarians are moving abroad to
countries in western Europe, which promise better wages, a higher standard of living, and
stronger democratic institutions. Every sixth Hungarian baby is now born outside of Hungary
(Euronews 2019). These emigration patterns could have a detrimental effect on the Hungarian
workforce of the future, especially given the long-term effects of such an aging workforce on the
Hungarian society that will manifest itself a generation, much less multiple generations, from
today.
The Hungarian government does not only use billboard or other advertising campaigns to
vilify and scapegoat is perceived enemies. It also uses such campaigns to promote policies of the
government, such as Orbán’s new policy in which women that have more than four children
would no longer have to pay income tax (Harris 2019 and Palfi). Many of these advertisements
are targeted specifically at certain audiences, such as young Hungarians. The government
attempts to relate to the target audiences of its advertising campaigns related to policy when it
creates ads on these sorts of issues. The couple depicted in the billboard advertisement for
Orbán’s family policy is the one from the so-called “distracted boyfriend meme,” a popular
internet meme showing a couple together while the boyfriend looks at a woman passing by from
the opposite direction (Harris 2019). As a result of this, critics say Orbán’s ad may implicitly
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promote infidelity, even though the couple in the ad is not depicted in any provocative or
potentially suggestive manner such as in the “distracted boyfriend meme.” This sort of
advertising shows an attempt to clearly appeal to younger Hungarians, who would be more likely
to be knowledgeable of contemporary internet trends, such as memes. It is also attempting to
encourage them to stay in Hungary, as more and more young Hungarians leave the country.
While Orbán would never be willing to compromise on his zero-tolerance immigration policy,
many Hungarians are deeply concerned about a potential brain drain in the country in the future
if the best and brightest young Hungarians continue to leave the country in considerable
numbers. These advertisements also show us that Orbán uses billboards to attempt to shape how
Hungarians perceive of political issues, rather than encouraging them to form their own opinions
from various independent and objective news sources.

B. Misinformation
The concept of truth is a critical part of civil society because it enables citizens to have at
least a common acceptance of basic facts. While there will always be political disagreements that
may be incredibly stark and strong in a democratic society, there needs to be at least some
common understanding of basic facts that are mutually accepted by all citizens as generally fact
rather than opinion, much less fiction. Unfortunately, even though Orbán has many perceived
“enemies,” there is no one he assails as intensely as George Soros. Much of the advertising that
Orbán ran during the 2018 Hungarian election campaign was focused on simply attacking Soros,
and he often resorts to outrageous conspiracy theories and outright misinformation to try to
smear him as viciously as possible. One crude billboard depicted Soros and several prominent
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opposition politicians holding wire clippers accompanied by a caption that translates to “they
would tear down the border fence together,” and another advertisement showed a heavily
Photoshopped picture of Soros’ face alongside a caption saying what translates to “don’t let
Soros have the last laugh” (Mackey 2018). These anti-Soros posters were found throughout
public transportation stations and on billboards all over Hungary. As a result, many Hungarians
encountered them on a daily basis. Orbán also spreads far more detailed and erroneous
misinformation about George Soros in campaigns that may as wide-reaching as his vile billboard
advertisements. In 2017, he sent two questionnaires to every Hungarian voter. The first
questionnaire asked voters for their opinions on how Fidesz has responded to EU migration
policies (Mackey 2018). The second questionnaire discussed a made-up “Soros plan” on
immigration policy that was made up of several components. None of these components were
even remotely based on fact. Respondents to this questionnaire would check their support or
opposition to the seven different points of this imaginary “Soros plan,” which included points
including allegation that Soros wants migrants to receive more lenient sentences than
non-migrants for criminal offenses, and that Soros would support the EU requiring Hungary to
pay each migrant 9 million forints (about $35,000 USD) in welfare (Mackey 2018). The likely
goal of this questionnaire was to further misinform the public in order to generate support for the
Hungarian government’s conspiratorial views on George Soros. A minority of Hungarian voters
responded to this survey, so it is unclear just how successful it was in terms of spreading
propaganda and shaping public opinion to justify illiberal attacks on Hungarian democratic
institutions. 8 million “Soros plan” questionnaires were sent out by the Hungarian government,
but only 2.3 million were returned–most of whom were Fidesz voters appalled by the imaginary
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“Soros plan” laid out in the survey (Mackey 2018). Questionnaires like this are used by Fidesz to
further polarize the Hungarian electorate and solidify support for the party among its political
base, who have become increasingly appalled by George Soros due to their receptivity to
anti-Soros messaging campaigns by the government. It is unclear how voters who do not support
Fidesz respond to the anti-Soros advertisement campaigns.
When one is exposed to such distorted media on a pervasive basis, one’s line of thinking
is at risk of being changed due to the sheer frequency of exposure to misinformation. This
misinformation does not only extend to Soros himself, but also to many Hungarian liberals that
are accused of being even remotely associated with him. Liberals in Hungary are frequently
attacked in the media with terms such as “Soros mercenaries.” This implies that according to
Fidesz, Soros is some sort of sinister puppeteer who controls and manipulates others to his will.
That notion, as well as many of the other depictions of Soros by Fidesz in Hungary today, are
based on anti-Semitic rhetoric. European history professor Dr. Edward Bristow, who was in
Hungary during the fall of 2016, said that “The posters of George Soros employed classical
anti-semitic tropes” (Bristow). Local newspapers in Hungary have also published visual graphics
that appear to show Soros as a “puppeteer” as well (Csaky quoted via tweet in Mackey 2018).
Given the sentiments against Jewish people among certain segments of the Hungarian
population, Orbán tragically feels that he can be especially successful in attempting to change his
country’s public culture by whipping up fear, hatred, and misinformation against a successful
Hungarian Jewish man.

C. Media Consolidation
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Orbán has also taken over much of the media in Hungary. Besides running billboard and
poster campaigns, Fidesz has bought out much of the country’s journalistic outlets. Recently,
owners of most pro-Fidesz media outlets agreed to form a conglomerate of nearly 500 outlets
and titles. This transaction was exempted by the government from antitrust review (Freedom
House 2019). It has become clear that Fidesz is more concerned about tightening their grip on
Hungarian society through media echo chambers rather than encouraging an open and objective
news market. Media outlets in Hungary today are far more likely to conform to Fidesz talking
points on policy, such as vilifying immigrants and scapegoating George Soros. As a result of this
media climate, it has been more and more likely for misinformation to go viral in Hungary. In
2017, a short video went viral that appears to show surveillance camera footage of two men
brutally attacking a woman praying in a church, who are implied by the video’s caption to be
immigrants. The video has been seen roughly 300,000 times on the Facebook page of a
pro-Fidesz media outlet, and the video’s caption translates to “Europe 2017: Is This What You
Want?” (Mackey 2018) However, a Hungarian news outlet found that the perpetrators of the
attack were two gang members in the United States. They also found that this incident occurred
in Omaha, Nebraska, and the audio found in the video of voices shouting “allahu akbar” was
added in (Mackey 2018). However, most of the Hungarian public watching such a video likely
would not know that it does not depict a real assault committed by migrants in Hungary. As a
result, those who view videos such as this are more vulnerable to Fidesz’s extensive
fear-mongering about immigrants. Even the most savvy individuals can still be vulnerable to
such misinformation on social media, especially since many would not go out of their way to
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question something the view on social media from a source that represents their “tribal”
ideology.
Fidesz’s control over the media is also designed to make it as difficult as possible for
opposition parties in Hungary to receive popular support. Double standards that are prevalent in
pro-government media outlets amplify this difficulty. For example, the center-left socialist bloc
in Hungary ended up destroying themselves electorally in the early 2000s due to an array of
corruption issues. However, their corruption was nowhere near the scale of the corrupt activities
committed by Fidesz. Yet there is not much socialists in Hungary could do to improve their
standing among media outlets, with so much of the media staunchly and ideologically
pro-Fidesz. Many Hungarians who primarily consume pro-government news outlets likely
believe that Fidesz is less corrupt today than the socialists were during their time in power.
Fidesz was able to achieve such intense control over the country’s media outlets by appointing
loyalists to key media-related positions. It is very common throughout the world for ruling
governments to nominate members of their party or coalition to lead key positions subject to
government oversight. However, Fidesz’s partaking in such actions is uniquely dangerous for
democracy since they nominated individuals for media council positions on the primary
condition that they would be loyal to the government above all else. From there, Fidesz voted in
July 2010 to amend Article 61 of Hungary’s constitution, which was designed to protect against
“monopolies in the media” (Hinsey 2012, 127). Hungary’s constitution has been revised multiple
times under Fidesz, normally to modify originally instituted protections for democratic
institutions and associated issues. Many watchdogs, non-governmental organizations and
oversight groups have noted that today, Fidesz has near-total control of a much of the Hungarian
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mainstream media. Furthermore, Hungary’s Media Council also has been given the right to block
Internet service providers (Hinsley 2012, 128).
The takeover of much of Hungarian media by the government has had drastic effects on
Hungarian journalism. It is estimated that by April 2011, less than a year after Fidesz’s media
laws passed, 1,000 journalists in Hungary had lost their jobs (Hinsley 2012, 131). The need for
independent and objective journalists is mandatory for a healthy and functioning democracy.
While much of Hungary’s political opposition is opposed to Fidesz’s media laws, they are
fractured and divided within themselves that it is difficult to orchestrate meaningful opposition.
The Hungarian opposition also consists of a wide spectrum of political opinion, which further
makes it difficult for opposition parties to find common ground. For example, there were clashes
between liberal parties and Jobbik during a January 2012 assembly against Hungary’s newly
revised constitution (Hinsley 2012, 126). The presence of Jobbik may not be easy for the rest of
Hungary’s opposition given their previously authoritarian nature and history of anti-Semitism
and anti-capitalist efforts. Today, Jobbik has moved away from the extreme right in an attempt to
court support away from Fidesz. Furthermore, Hungary’s opposition does not have a clear and
unified vision for what they would do to promote media independence in Hungary. It is
important to note that freedom of the press is still protected in Hungary. As a result, citizens are
technically still free to publish independent journalistic content that is critical of the government.
However, the worsening political climate of the country under Fidesz increases pressure on the
remaining independent journalists in Hungary to turn a blind eye to holding the government
accountable. In order to promote media independence in Hungary, the country’s opposition
should focus on uniting its bloc together with a detailed proposal to preserve and strengthen civil
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society in the country. Even then, however, Orbán undoubtedly has the upper hand in the
country’s media climate. Sadly, he will likely have such an advantage for a long time to come
given the sheer extent of Fidesz’s domination of the media. At this point in time, Fidesz is also
likely to remain in power for a long time as well, given their current supermajority in the
Hungarian parliament as well as extensive gerrymandering efforts that degrade the freedom and
fairness of Hungary’s elections.

V.

Viktor Orbán’s Control of Culture
A. How Fidesz Views A “Public Culture”
Orbán’s political appeal in Hungary is also built on how he attempts to inflame so-called

“culture wars.” To him and Fidesz, opposition to liberalism spans not only in his attacks on civil
society, but also his perceived need to promote so-called “traditional values.” For example, a
pro-Orbán newspaper wrote an opinion piece criticizing a performance of the show Billy Elliot at
the national opera house in Budapest. The piece claimed that the show was problematic because
it could make children gay (Komuves 2018). The irony of Orbán’s pervasive stoking of culture
wars is that most effects of that happen in Budapest rather than in the more rural areas of
Hungary, which are more likely to be pro-Fidesz. Many Fidesz voters in rural Hungary rarely
have experiences that might be attributed to that of the country’s cultural elite, which also means
that they end up further buying into Fidesz’s demonization of liberalism. Just like in many other
bitterly polarized countries, there almost seem to be two different Hungarys: a cosmopolitan and
liberal one primarily centered around Budapest, and a traditional and illiberal one centered
around the countryside. It is impossible to understand the extent to which culture-war rhetoric
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degrades civil society in Hungary without looking at its effects on education. During Orbán’s
time in office, Fidesz has essentially rewritten much of the curriculum for elementary and
secondary schools (Freedom House 2019). This revised curricula increases historical revisionism
in order to attempt to depict Hungary in a far more nationalistic and jingoistic manner. Orbán has
also moved to terminate programs of study generally considered liberal in Hungarian higher
education. The Hungarian government stopped accreditation for gender studies programs in
universities in 2018 (Freedom House 2019 and Komuves 2018).
Fidesz’s incendiary rhetoric designed to enable democratic decline extends not only to
cultural issues, but also to religion as well. Orbán views himself as the savior and leader of a
Christian nation who is called to avenge those supposedly against traditional Christian values
and practices. He sometimes invokes Christianity in defense of his controversial immigration
policies (Walker 2019). Fidesz claims that multiculturalism, which includes religious pluralism,
is a threat to Hungary. Orbán has frequently resorted to demagogic rhetoric to deride Islam,
claiming that his government must pursue anti-immigrant policies to attempt to keep out Muslim
migrants. As more and more Hungarian media is bought out by the government, fear-mongering
about Muslims is increasingly prevalent in the country’s news landscape. The 2019 Freedom
House report on Hungary states that “Government-led xenophobic campaigns in recent years
have fueled anti-Muslim sentiment, which in turn has discouraged the open practice of Islam”
(Freedom House 2019). The Hungarian government’s inflammatory attacks on George Soros
have also been criticized for some for possible anti-Semitic undertones, including attempts to tie
Soros into global conspiracies and scapegoating of him based on his financial status. While
freedom of religion is permitted in Hungary, vicious attacks on religious minorities only further
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serve to damage practice of a wide variety of religions, not to mention the social fabric of the
country as a whole. These attacks also end up having effects on a variety of cultural institutions
in Hungary. For example, after the show Billy Elliot was pulled at the national opera house in
Budapest, the theatre announced that the topic for its next season would focus on Christianity
(Komuves 2018).

B. The Arts
Orbán’s government also has degraded the role that the arts play in public life in
Hungary. This has been achieved by stacking key artistic and cultural jobs in Hungary with
Fidesz loyalists, who can then selectively focus solely or primarily on creating or funding arts
that are in affirmation with the nationalistic views of the government. An example of this is how
film production has changed in Hungary during Orbán’s time in power. Hungary is not generally
well-known for its film industry, but some recent films such as Laszló Nemes’ Son of Saul have
generated international acclaim. Orbán accused filmmakers involved with Hungary’s motion
picture foundation of embezzlement, and the foundation was dismantled (Győri 2018). This was
likely because he wanted to have greater control over potential political messages coming from
films being made in Hungary with state funds in order to further attempt to indoctrinate the
moviegoing populace. Orbán then put a wealthy Hungarian movie tycoon named Andy Vajna in
charge of film in Hungary. Vajna had made a fortune in Hollywood in the 1980s helping work on
popular U.S. action films such as Rambo and Total Recall. Vajna started working closely with
Orbán, although disastrous decisions were made from the beginning of his tenure; for example,
no films in Hungary were made for over two years after Vajna started his role as the
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“government commissioner for renewing Hungarian cinema” (Győri 2018). The clear attempt by
Fidesz to politicize the country’s film industry was made blatantly clear in 2010, when
Hungary’s declared secretary of state at the time told filmmakers that “now we are building a
new world” (Szőcs quoted in Győri 2018). Film has always been used as a tool by directors to
shape and create unique views of the world for audiences to experience, but a country that allows
its government to manipulate film in such a manner for censorious reasons is a nation headed
down a disturbing path of democratic decline.
Other art forms and artistic groups in Hungary have also been influenced by Fidesz. This
includes the National Theatre in Budapest. Many artists in Hungary who are not supportive of
Fidesz have spoken out against this government influence, although those in Hungary’s creative
community that support the government have generally accepted this overhaul, especially since
some of them potentially stand to gain appointments to high-level positions if they are perceived
of as both prominent and loyal to the government. Orbán appointees are primarily selected on
their loyalty to Fidesz, but an array of other factors can come into play. This may include how
the appointee may physically appear in comparison with what Orbán views as a “Hungarian”
identity. For example, a special commissioner to Orbán wrote a letter in 2011 about the new
director of the Szolnok theatre. He opened this letter by talking about the new director’s
“flashing blue eyes” (Győri 2018). This is a reference to Aryan heritage, as was instilled into the
popular consciousness during World War II by the atrocities of the Nazi regime. The Nazis
claimed that the preferred “Aryan” race would be built on those who had blond hair and blue
eyes. This continues Orbán’s attempts to establish an “in-group” and an “out-group,” with the
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in-group consisting primarily of culturally conservative ethnic Hungarians and the out-group
consisting of religious and ethnic minorities.

C. Academic Freedom
Attacks on academic freedom is also a deeply distressing way in which Fidesz attempts to
control how the Hungarian public perceives of as culture. The Hungarian government’s refusal to
sign an agreement on the status of Central Europe University was not the only example of this.
Fidesz has attempted to further consolidate government control over non-governmental
organizations, research bodies, and public education. Right now, Fidesz is planning to further
exert control over the Hungarian Academy of Sciences by giving control of them to a
government-run council (Dunai 2019). This decision prompted protests in Hungary in June 2019,
who marched between several academic institutions that have been placed under heightened or
total state control in Budapest. These attempts to degrade the value of independent academic
inquiry are part of a broader strategy by Fidesz to decrease promotion of intellectualism in order
to encourage the public not to question Fidesz rhetoric and propaganda. Anti-intellectualism has
long gone hand-in-hand with authoritarianism, since authoritarian leaders do not want the public
to think for themselves, much less differently than the leader. Fidesz has already been suspended
from the EPP within the European Parliament, and it is unlikely that they will return to the bloc
any time soon. The feeling is mutual, as Fidesz feels much closer ideologically to the
emboldened group of far-right parties that overperformed in the May 2019 European Parliament
elections, while the center-right EPP does not wish to compromise on the need for strong
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democratic institutions and a strong, united European Union. This stands in stark contrast to
Orbán’s worldview.

D. Historical Revisionism
Revisionist history is another way that Orbán has attempted to manipulate the public
culture of Hungary. Orbán has gone to startling lengths to try to modify what the Hungarian
public views as a consensus surrounding basic facts and interpretations of historical events from
twentieth-century Hungary. Fidesz paid for a new museum in Budapest known as the House of
Terror, or “Terrorhaza.” This museum is supposedly designed to remember and warn about the
dangerous effects of authoritarianism in Hungary. This includes both the fascist regime during
World War II as well as the communist regime during the mid-to-late twentieth century.
However, the House of Terror has been highly controversial since its inception due to allegations
of revisionist history. Orbán’s critics argue that the museum was primarily built to vilify the
Communist Party as well as left-wing politicians while not condemning fascism and
extreme-right politicians in an equivalent manner. These critics note that there are over twelve
rooms in the House of Terror, but only two are devoted to discussion of fascism (Sodaro 2018).
As a result, some believe that this museum is yet another attempt by Orbán to try to change the
public culture of his country by further attacking the left on a level not comparable to the right. If
Hungarian citizens buy into the notion that authoritarianism is primarily “leftist” in ideology, that
benefits and emboldens Orbán’s authoritarianism because it is able to provide him cover to
recede democratic institutions. Orbán has praised fascist leaders from the country’s past by
discussing their “strength,” including Miklós Horthy, who ruled Hungary during most of World
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War II and worked with the Nazis to send Jews in Hungary to concentration camps. This sort of
rhetoric further provides Orbán cover with ensuring at least his supporters view him as a
strongman. A new museum on the Holocaust, the House of Fates, is newly opening. It has long
been controversial since its announcement, and has been accused of Holocaust revisionism when
an official said that the museum would tell the “story of love between Hungarian Jews and
non-Jews” (McAuley 2019). Orbán has since hired a Hasidic rabbi to “reimagine” the museum
and serve as its director, likely out of a desire to avoid possible further accusations of
anti-Semitism by his critics (McAuley 2019). The museum has been deeply controversial among
Jewish leaders, some of whom view it as an example of Holocaust revisionism (Aderet 2018).
Orbán’s revisionist history and appeals to “the past” even expand to how he and Fidesz
view the horrors of the Nazi regime. He believes that Hungarians had no moral responsibility for
the genocide of millions of Jews and others during the Holocaust, yet this is simply not true in
reality. This revisionist view of history is particularly dangerous because Fidesz rhetoric on this
topic is meant to sound “legitimate,” rather than fictional. As a result, it can skew people’s
understanding of history. Furthermore, it scapegoats and dehumanizes those killed during the
Holocaust by trivializing the atrocities committed by the Nazis. An example of the increasingly
revisionist narrative constructed around the Holocaust today in modern Hungary is the 2014
Holocaust memorial, which is located in Freedom Square in Budapest. This monument depicts a
German eagle attacking the Archangel Gabriel, which is considered a symbol of Hungary (Győri
2018). As a result, the implied message of the memorial is that the atrocities of the Holocaust
were only the fault of the Germans, rather than anyone in Hungary having moral responsibility
for such depravity. This monument has created intense controversy since it opened in Hungary

Rizzi 39
due to its allegation that Hungarians had minimal, if any, role in the Holocaust. When Freedom
Square was redesigned, statues to several more progressive figures not supported by Fidesz and
its leaders were also removed (Győri 2018). By not only attempting to spread a message of
revisionist history but also to extinguish more progressive elements of Hungary’s past, Fidesz is
attempting to modify how Hungarians view history at the expense of their ability to view history
with at least some objectivity and find at least some agreement on common facts.
Revisionist history has become a key part of some other right-wing populist governments
in Central and Eastern Europe. For example, Poland passed a law in 2018 that made it illegal to
claim that Poles had moral responsibility for the Holocaust. This law received intense backlash
from much of the world outside of Poland, with many accusing the country’s ruling, right-wing
party (Law and Justice) of trivializing the Holocaust. Lithuania’s Museum of Genocide has been
critcized for trivializing the atrocities of the Holocaust in Lithuania, where 90 percent of the
country’s Jews were killed (McAuley 2019). In Lithuania, memory surrounding both Nazi and
Soviet rule is especially divisive because many anti-communist leaders and martyrs were
supporters and/or enablers of the Nazi regime during World War II (Cassedy 2007, 82). A
variety of other countries in Central and Eastern Europe also have popular support for right-wing
populist and anti-migrant policies. For example, the Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev
notes that “The Bulgarians have identified themselves completely with Orbán’s reading of the
refugee crisis; they feel they are represented by him” (Krastev quoted in Lendvai 2017, 199).

VI.

Conclusion
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Viktor Orbán’s government in contemporary Hungary serves as a striking and disturbing
example of the corrosive effects of so-called “illiberal democracy.” During his tenure, Orbán has
bought out media outlets, run incendiary and propagandistic campaigns against migrants and
George Soros, and degraded the independence of his country’s judiciary. The most prominent
effect of illiberalism in a country is the dilution of civil society. This is achieved under illiberal
governments by rhetoric attempting to change the public culture of a nation. That may include,
but is not limited to, fervently nationalistic or irredentist remarks. It remains to be seen whether
Orbán could be defeated electorally in the spring of 2022. However, as more and more sustained
attacks on democracy occur by Fidesz, the prospects for a possible return of liberalism to
Hungary look dimmer and dimmer. These dim prospects are also exacerbated by the extent to
which Orbán has attempted to manipulate his country’s public culture through a variety of
means, such as media consolidation, propaganda campaigns, and appeals to a seemingly
jingoistic and irredentist past. Since these examples of actions and rhetoric are closely correlated
to the manipulation of Hungary’s “public culture” and associated consciousness, they have
impacted the country’s movement towards illiberalism over recent time. Prospects for a healthy
democracy with a flourishing civil society in Hungary were never especially strong due to the
damning impact of communism on the country, as well as the fact that it is a very young
democracy. It remains to be seen how Fidesz will work in the European Parliament going
forward. The EU could use more of its leverage to prevent Hungary from engaging in
anti-democratic activities, especially given that a small but significant percentage of Hungary’s
GDP comes entirely from EU funds. As a result, one can say that Fidesz is attacking Hungarian
democracy on the dime of those paying taxes to the EU (Garton Ash 2019). It has become far
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more difficult to promote liberal values in Hungary today than it was when Orbán was elected in
2010, but there will need to be clear efforts by Hungarian citizens to move away from
authoritarianism in government as well as to resist the worst impulses that can be brought out by
intense manipulation of the “public culture.”
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